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JAMES S. DEAN, as Director of the Department of Finance
et al., Petitioners, v. THOMAS H. KUCHEL, as State
Controller, Respondent.
[1] Fish and Game-Regulation-Validity of Statute Governing.-The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1947 is not unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of power, and mandamus
lies to compel the State Controller to draw warrants for payments of salaries of employees of the Wildlife Conservation
Board. (Stats. 1947, ch. 1325; Am. Stats. 1949, ch. 1440;
3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9250.)
[2] Constitutional Law- Legislature- Extent of Powers.- The
state Constitution is not a grant of power but a limitation
or restriction on the powers of the Legislature.
[3] !d.-Legislature-Extent of Powers.-Constitutional limitations on the Legislature's powers should be strictly construed,
and any doubt as to the Legislature's power to act in a given
case should be resolved in favor of the action.
[ 4] !d.-Distribution of Powers-Limitations.-Express enumeration of legislative powers in the Constitution is not an exclusion of others not named unless accompanied by negative
terms.
[5] Fish and Game-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.As used in Const. art. IV, § 25¥2, stating that the Legislature
may delegate to the Fish and Game Commission such powers
relating to fish and game as the Legislature sees fit, the word
"may" is at least reasonably susceptible of a permissive rather
than a mandatory or prohibitory meaning.
[6] !d.-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.-That the Legislature may, under Const. art. IV, § 25lj2 , delegate to the Fish
and Game Commission such powers as the Legislature may
see fit indicates that it may fail to delegate any powers.
[7] !d.-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.-In adopting
the amendment of Const. art. IV, § 25¥2, establishing a Fish
and Game Commission, the people did not intend to strip the
[2] See 5 Cal.Jur. 666; 11 Am.Jur. 894.
[4] See 5 Cal.Jur. 666; 11 Am.Jur. 890.
[5] See 5 Cal.Jur.lO-Yr. Supp. (1944 Rev.) 1071; 22 Am.Jur. 696.
McK. Dig References: [1] Fish, §8, Game, §6; [2,3,9] Constitutional Law, § 2; [4] Constitutional Law, § 76; [5-8] Fish,
§ 15, Game, § 6.
37 C.2d-4
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legislative and executive departments of all power with relation to fish and game and substitute a commission with unlimited power in the field; nor did the people intend to place
a straitjacket on the Legislature by requiring that, in its
legislation in the fish and game field, it act solely through
such commission.

[8] !d.-Regulation-Fish and Game Commission.-Const. art. IV,
§ 25lj2 , establishing a Fish and Game Commission, is not a
special provision controlling over the general provision creating the legislative department.
[9] Constitutional Law- Legislature- Extent of Powers.- The
Legislature has all legislative power not expressly or by necessary implication denied to it by the Constitution.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel State Controller
to draw warrants for payment of salaries of employees of
Wildlife Conservation Board. Writ granted.
Frank K. Richardson, Ralph N. Kleps, Legislative Counsel,
Chas. W. Johnson, Chief Deputy Legislative Counsel, and
Joseph W. Paulucci, Deputy Legislative Counsel, for Petitioners.
Edwin J. Regan, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Bert \V. Levit, Chief
Deputy Attorney General, Ralph W. Scott and W. R. Augustine, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
Robert L. Mann, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
CARTER, J.-In 1947, the Legislature passed the "Wildlife Conservation Act of 1947" ( Stats. 1947, ch. 1325; Am.
Stats. 1949, ch. 1440; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9250).
It declares that the "preservation, protection and restoration"
of wild life in the state and maintaining "high productivity"
thereof is the public policy of the state. To achieve those
aims ''a single and coordinated program for the acquisition
of lands and facilities suitable for recreational purposes and
adaptable for conservation, propagation and utilization of
the fish and game resources of the State is hereby established.''
(Id., § 1.) In the Department of Natural Resources (Pub.
Resources Code, § 501) there is created a Wildlife Conservation Board, consisting of the President of the ]~ish and
Game Commission, an employee or executive officer of the
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commiSSIOn, chosen by the commission, and the Director of
B'inanee. Three members each of the Senate and Assembly
shall meet with the board and participate in its activities to
the extent that such participation is not incompatible with
their membership in the Legislature. (Id., § 2.) The board
Rhall study and determine the areas and land in the state
most sJ,itable for the production and preservation of wild life
and· f<f recreation, and, as a result of such study, shall determini what areas shall be acquired by the state ''to effectuate
a coordinated and balanced program resulting in the maximum
revival of wild life in the State and in the maximum recreational advantages to the people of the State," (I d. § 3) and
may authorize the acquisition of such areas by the Fish
and Game Commission or the State Public Works Board.
The commission, when authorized by the board shall construct such facilities as are suitable. Completed areas are
to be managed by the commission. (Id., § 3.) The money
in the Wildlife RBcreation Fund is available for expenditure
under the act. Also in 1947, section 19627 of the Business
and Professions Code was amended to create a Wildlife Restoration Fund and with the direction that $3,000,000 per year
be paid into it from the license fees from horse race meetings.
(Stats. 1947, ch. 1327, § 1.) The Conservation Act repealed
Budget Item 245 for 1947, which amounted to $1,400,000 for
use by the commission in construction, improvement and
repairs, and equipment. (I d.,· § 5.)
[1] Pursuant to the act the board employed Seth Gordon
to make a survey of conditions in California. Respondent,
State Controller, has refused to draw warrants for the payment of the salary of Gordon and other employees on the
ground that the act is unconstitutional. Petitioner seeks by
this proceeding in mandamus to compel him to draw such
warrants.
The constitutional provision invoked states: ''The Legislature may provide for the division of the State into fish and
game districts and may enact such laws for the protection of
fish and game in such districts or parts thereof as it may
deem appropriate.
'"l'here shall be a Fish and Game Commission of five members appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by
the Senate, with a term of office of six years . . . The Legislature may delegate to the commission such powers relating to
the protection, propagation and preservation of fish and game
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as the Legislature sees :fit. Any member of the commiSSIOn
may be removed by concurrent resolution of the Legislature
passed by the vote of a majority of the members elected to
each of the two houses thereof." (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 251h,
as amended in 1948.) That section was originally added to
the Constitution in 1902 and then included only the first paragraph. By amendment in 1940, the second paragraph was
added. The 1948 amendment made no change here pertinent.
It is asserted that by reason of the above constitutional
provision the Legislature has no authority to delegate to anyone except the commission any powers relating to the protection, propagation and preservation of fish and game ; that
under the rule of construction, expTessio unius est exclusio
alteTius (the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another thing), that result must be reached; and that, therefore, the Conservation Act is invalid because it delegates such
powers to the conservation board. The applicable legal
principles compel a contrary conclusion.
[2] The fundamental rule has been stated by this court:
''There is no express prohibition against the allowance or
reimbursement for other expenses, but the respondent contends that under the doctrine of expressio uni1ts est exclusio
alterit~,s, since the Constitution specified two items which may
be allowed, any other allowances are invalid. This argument oveTlooks the fact that our Constitution is not a grant
of power but rather a limitatio11 or restriction upon the powers
of the Legislature [citations] and 'that we do not look to the
Constitution to determine whether the Legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited.' (Fitts
v. SuperioT Court, snpm [6 Cal.2d 230 (57 P.2d 510)].)
[3] If there is any doubt as to the Legislature's power to act
in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of
the Legislature's action. Such restrictions and limitations
arc to be construed str1:ctly, and are not to be extended to include matters not covered by .the language used." (Emphasis
added.) (Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912,915 [152 P.2d 169].)
(See, also, City of Los Angeles v. Post War etc. Board, 26 Cal.
2d 101 [156 P.2d 746] ; Delaney v. Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561
[154 P.2d 674]; 5 Cal.Jnr. 666-670.) [4] Specifically, the
express enumeration of legislative powers is not an exclusion
of others not named unless accompanied by negative terms.
(Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395; Macmillan Co. v. Clarke,
184 Cal. 491 [194 P. 1030, 17 A.IJ.R. 288] ; Slavick v. Walsh,
82 Cal.App.2d 228 [186 P.2d 35].)
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There are numerous pertinent illustrations of the application of that principle. The provision that the Legislature
shall protect from forced sale a homestead for heads of
families does not limit its power to provide homesteads for
others than heads of families. (Hohn v. Patdy, 11 Cal.App.
724 [106 P. 266] .) Provisions authorizing removal of officers
by trial for misdemeanor in office and the recall of specified
officers, the first including and the second not including those
of an irrigation district do not prevent the Legislature from
authorizing the recall of the latter. (Wigley v. South San
Joaquin Irr. Dist., 31 Cal.App. 162 [159 P. 985] .) A grant
of power to county boards of education (Cal. Const., art IX,
§ 7) to ''control'' examination of teachers and ''granting
teachers certificates,'' did not oust the Legislature of power
to establish the requisites for a teacher's certificate. (Mitchell
v. Winnek, 117 Cal. 520 [49 P. 579].) The court there stated
(p. 525): "If, therefore, it be asserted, as it is here, in effect,
that the power of the legislature to enact section 1503 of the
Political Code does not exist, the restriction or limitation
of that power must not only be found in the constitution,
but the prohibition of its exercise must be clear. It must
appear either from express words or by necessary implication.
It is not asserted that there is any express prohibition, nor
does the use of the word 'control' necessarily imply that the
power of legislation upon the subject in question is prohibited
to the legislature. Apparently inconsistent provisions must
be harmonized, and each given some effect, if that be possible.
To give the word 'control' the effect given it by the court
below, some qualifying word, such as 'exclusive,' 'absolute,'
or 'unlimited,' must be implied, since without implication that
word does not necessarily imply that the legislature has no
power to declare that holders of the specified diplomas should
be entitled to certificates of the grammar grade.''
Here there are factors which not only create a doubt that
the Legislature was to be restricted to acting through the
Fish and Game Commission in legislating in the fish and
game field, but there are indications that it was not to be
so limited. 'l'he wording of section 25% points in that direction. It begins with the declaration that the Legislatttre may
enact such laws for the protection of fish and game ''as it may
deem appropriate." The commission is created and to it the
Legislature may delegate such powers relating to fish and
game as it sees fit. [5] The word "may" is at least reason-
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ably susceptible of a permissive meaning rather than mandatory or prohibitory, and it has been held that when such
word is used it will not create a restriction on the legislative
power even though the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 22)
also provides : ''The provisions of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." (See Presno National Bank v.
Superior Conrt, 83 Cal. 491 [24 P. 157]; People v. Nye, 9 Cal.
App. 148 [99 P. 241] ; Mundell v. Lyons, 182 Cal. 289 [187
P. 950) ; but see In re Cencinino, 31 Cal.App. 238 [160 P.
167].) [6] That it may delegate such powers as it may
see fit indicates that it may fail to delegate any powers. It is
true that the provision may impliedly mean that it may
or may not, at its discretion, delegate such powers, but if
it does, they must be conferred on the commission. But this
is not necessarily the meaning or a necessarily implied negative; nor does it eliminate any doubt.
The important problems in the fish and game field have
long been entrusted to the Legislature as the representative
of all the people. ''The people shall have the right to fish
upon and from the public lands of the State and in the waters
thereof, excepting upon lands set aside for fish hatcheries
and no land owned by the State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in the people the absolute right to
fish thereupon; and no law shall ever be passed making it a
crime for the people to enter upon the public lands within
this State for the purpose of fishing in any water containing
fish that have been planted therein by the State; provided,
that the Legislature may by statttte, prom:de for the season
when and the conditions under which the different species of
fish may be taken." (Emphasis added.) (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 25.) Moneys collected under fish and game laws are to be
used in matters pertaining to that subject and "the Legislature may provide for the division of'' such money. (Cal.
Const., art. IV, § 25%.) It is said in In re Marincovich, 48
Cal.App. 474,481 [192 P. 156): "Wild game (included within
which is fish, People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397
[48 P. 37 4, 58 Am.St.Rep. 183, 39 L.R.A. 581] ) always has
belonged to all the people of the state. It is evident, therefore,
that what the people of the state own they can alienate on such
terms as they choose to impose, and that the Legislature, as
the law-making representative of all the people, may dispose
of the fish in the state's deep-sea waters on such terms as to it
may seem best-subject only to the constitutional limitations
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against discrimination. Within those limitations, the Legislature, for the protection of :fish, may pass such laws as to it
may seem most wise. The measures best adapted to that end
are for the Legislature to determine . . . '' [7] In view of
those policies and principles, we do not believe the people in
adopting the amendment to section 25¥2 intended to place a
straitjacket on the Legislature by requiring it to act solely
through the Fish and Game Commission thereby created.
Nor does the argument presented to the voters for the amendment shed a contrary light. The measure was entitled for
the ballot : ''.Amends Constitution, .Article IV, section 25lj2 •
Creates Fish and Game Commission of :five members, appointed by Governor subject to confirmation by Senate, with
six year terms, removable by majority vote of Legislature;
rotates terms by requiring terms of those :first appointed shall
expire one each year. Empowers Legislature to delegate to
Commission powers relating to protection, propagation and
preservation of :fish and game.'' There is no intimation that
the Legislature would be thereby prohibited from exercising
other powers not delegated. The main thought was that it
was empowered to delegate authority to the commission. The
argument for this amendment states that it "will remove the
Fish and Game Commissioners from political influence by:
"1. Providing a nonsalaried board of :five commissioners.
'' 2. .Appointment of commissioners for staggered terms so
that no one administration can dominate the commission.
'rhis avoids a sudden reversal of policy.
"3. 'I'he Governor's appointments of commissioners are to
be confirmed by the Senate which will nullify poor appointments.
''This proposition will give an opportunity to the Division
of Fish and Game to manage the wild-life resources of the State
on a basis of sound, scientific and factual knowledge by:
'' 1. .Allowing Legislature to delegate regulatory powers
to the commission so that regulations may be based on scientific
knowledge rather than on supposition and hearsay from selfinterested pressure groups.
' '2. .Allowing the commission to establish and follow through
long term policies and plans for scientific :fish and game
management.
'' 3 . .Allowing the commission to employ and retain thoroughly trained personnel so that the management policies of
'sustained yield without endangering future supply' may be
effectively carried through.'' The matter chiefly stressed
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is the right of the Legislature to delegate powers to the
commission, probably out of an abundance of caution to avoid
the possibility that such delegation would constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The major thought
is the enlargement rather than curtailment of the power of
the Legislature in dealing with problems with respect to fish
and game.
There are cases which have applied the rule expressio unius
est exclusio alterius in construing the Constitution. (See
Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224 [92 P. 353]; In re Werner,
129 Cal. 567 [62 P. 97] ; Spie1· v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370 [52 P.
659, 41 A.L.R. 196] ; Martello v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 400
[261 P. 476]; People v. Wells, 2 Cal. 198.) In the Wheeler
case the restriction was positive and express. In the Werner
case the court was dealing with an express and direct delegation of legislative power to cities and towns to enact police,
etc, regulations (Cal. Const., art XI, § 11) and involved the
:fundamental structure of the state and local government.
'l'he Spier case involved the right of suffrage declared to be
one of the "highest privileges" of citizens and was express
and explicit. In the Martello case there was a complete
change in the method of assignment of judges and a :former
provision that had also been stated by statute was omitted,
thus indicating an implied repeal of the statute. The court
in the Wells case was dealing with the separation of powers
and felt that the construction given was necessary to preserve
the courts from the uncontrolled domination of the Legislature.
It is urged by respondent that when the Constitution
creates an office the Legislature cannot add to or detract
:from the powers such office traditionally or theretofore possessed (see Love v. Baehr, 47 Cal. 364). The instant constitutional provision, while it creates a Fish and Game Commission, does not give it any powers, and, as seen, it leaves with
the Legislature the power to give it such authority as it
"sees fit." It cannot be lightly assumed that the people
intended to strip the legislative and executive departments
of all power with relation to fish and game, and substitute
:for them, a Fish and Game Commission with unlimited power
in this field. [8] For the same reasons it may not be said
that it is a special provision controlling over a general provision (that creating· the legislative department). [9] It
must be conceded that the Legislature has all legislative power
not expressly or by necessary implication denied to it by
the Constitution. It is not like a provision creating an execu-
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tive or judicial office, each of which departments 1s entitled
to its sphere of authority under the separation of powers
principle. The construction urged by respondent would result in a direct invasion of legislative power in a field in
which such power has not been abridged by constitutional
mandate.
If the people, by the amendment here involved, desired to
repose in the commission created therein the exclusive power
to control the fish and game resources of the state, this
objective could have been achieved by employing language
similar to that used in the provision for the control of the
liquor industry in this state (see Cal. Const. art. XX, § 22).
There are objectives which the people may well have
desired to achieve in adopting the instant constitutional
amendment creating a Fish and Game Commission. They
may have desired, as above noted, to make it clear, that the
Legislature could, if it wished, delegate some of its powers
in the specified field to such commission, regardless of the
principle of separation of powers; that the members of the
eommission should have six-year terms and thus achieve
more stability in administration (see constitutional provision
fixing four years as term of office, Cal. Const. art. XX, § 16) ;
and that the commissioners could be removed by a concurrent resolution adopted by a majority vote of the Legislature.
\Ve may not assume that the Legislature, by adopting the
statute here involved, intended to defeat any of those objectives.
Let the writ issue forthwith.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.

